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The Convention on Biological
Diversity-An Efficient Framework for
the Preservation of Life on Earth?
Daniel T. Jenks*
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he
created him; male and female he created them. And God blessed them,
and God said to them, "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and
subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds
of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth." And
God said, "Behold, I have given you every plant yielding seed which is
upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit; you
shall have them for food. And to every beast of the earth, and to every
bird of the air, and to everything that creeps on the earth, everything
that has the breath of life, I have given every green plant for food."
And it was so. And God saw everything that he had made, and behold,
it was very good.'
I. INTRODUCrION
On June 5, 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity was in-
troduced for signature at the so-called "Earth Summit" in Rio de
Janeiro.2 The Convention was one of four international agreements
proposed at the Earth Summit.3 The Convention's explicit objectives
are to conserve the Earth's biological diversity (or "biodiversity") for
future generations, to exploit this biodiversity in a sustainable way and
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law; Masters of Management
Candidate, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, 1995. I would like to thank my wife
Mary for her support and insight in writing this Comment.
1 Genesis 1:27-30.
2 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5,1992, art. 1, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force
Dec. 29, 1993)[hereinafter Convention].
3 The Agreements include the Rio Declaration, Convention on Climate Change, Conven-




to share the benefits of biodiversity in a fair and equitable manner.
Biological diversity is defined as "the variability among living orga-
nisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and
other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they
are a part."5
The Convention has several major provisions. First, it recognizes
a limited sovereign property right in genetic material found within a
nation's boundaries.6 Genetic material is defined as "any material of
plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functioning units of
heredity".7 Second, the Convention calls on developed countries to
transfer to developing countries (i) technology "relevant to the con-
servation and sustainable use of biodiversity"8' and (ii) "technology
which makes use of .... (genetic) resources." 9 Third, the Convention
requires the establishment of a multi-lateral fund financed by the de-
veloped countries to support the purposes of the Convention.10 Fi-
nally, the Convention contains provisions related to the monitoring of
biodiversity and the handling of biotechnology."
II. THE UNITED STATES DEBATE
While most of the industrialized world signed the Convention at
Rio de Janeiro, the United States under President Bush declined to
adopt the Convention for a number of reasons including (i) the Con-
vention's treatment of existing intellectual property rights and tech-
nology transfers, (ii) concerns about how the Convention would be
financed and (iii) disincentives to the development of new biotechnol-
ogy products.' 2 The loudest criticism in the United States came
chiefly from biotechnology companies and their advocates. These
critics contended that (i) elements of the Convention seemed to call
for the compulsory licensing of intellectual property products and (ii)
4 Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, 31 I.L.M., at 823.
5 Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, 31 I.LM., at 823.
6 Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, §§ 1, 4, 5, 7, 31 I.LM., at 828.
7 Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, 31 I.L.M., at 824.
8 Convention, supra note 2, art. 16, § 1, 31 .L.M., at 829.
9 Convention, supra note 2, art. 16, § 3, 31 IL.M., at 829.
10 Convention, supra note 2, arts. 20-21, 31 I.L.M., at 830-32.
11 Convention, supra note 2, art. 7, 31 I.L.M., at 825; Convention, supra note 2, art. 14, 31
IL.M., at 827-28; Convention, supra note 2, art. 19, 31 I.L.M., at 830.
12 See United States, Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment Programme for
the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity, issued May 22,
1992, 31 1.L.M. 848. See also U.S. Pledges Support for Global Environmental Facility, Reuters,
USA, Aug. 4, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS; Tom Kenworthy, Saving Plant and
Animal Life: Treaty on Biological Diversity Offers Possibility of Breakthrough, WASH. POST,
June 1, 1992, at A15.
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the granting of a sovereign property right in genetic material would
discourage pharmaceutical research and would result in fewer new
drugs being discovered.' 3 Supporters of the Convention, in contrast,
argued that there could be no long-term pharmaceutical research
without the Convention because, absent conservation incentives for
the developing world, there would be very little biodiversity left.'4
On April 21, 1993 (Earth Day), President Clinton announced that
the United States would sign the Convention on Biological Diversity
and on June 4, 1993, the United States became a signatory.15 In sign-
ing the Convention, which most observers agreed was poorly
drafted,'16 the United States explicitly retained the right to issue, con-
current with United States ratification, an "interpretive statement"
concerning the Convention's provisions.' 7
While there were many reasons for signing the Convention,'"
President Clinton made two chief arguments in support of the Con-
13 See John H. Barton, Biodiversity at Rio, 42 BioScIENcE 773, 775 (Nov. 1992)(Conven-
tion's critics believe art. 16, § 5 calls for compulsory licensing). See also Melinda Chandler, The
Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer, 4 COLO. J. INT'L
L. & PoL'y 141, 163 (1993) (art. 16, § 5 was perhaps the most objectionable provision with regard
to intellectual property protection). See also Dan L. Burk et al., Biodiversity and Biotechnology,
260 SC. 1900, 1901 (1993) (language of treaty seems to suggest compulsory licenses, which is
ironic given the low level of intellectual property protection in the developing world). See also
Graeme Browning, Biodiversity Battle, NAT'L JOURNAL, June 8, 1992, at 1830. Biotechnology
companies have other concerns with the Convention, such as the possible need under Article 19
for a protocol on the handling of biotechnology. Draft Statements to Interpret Treaty Said Under
Examination By Administration, Apr. 5,1993, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED.
14 See Adam L. Streltzer, Comment, U.S. Biotechnology Intellectual Property Rights As An
Obstacle to the UNCED Convention on Biological Diversity: It Just Doesn't Matter, 6 TRAs-
NAT'L LAW 271 (1993).
15 Alex Barnum, Companies, Environmentalists United on Treaty, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 24,
1993, at B1; As It Signs Treaty, United States Calls For Global Patent Protection For Biotech, June
8, 1993, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED; Remarks on Earth Day, 29 WEEKLY COMp. PRES.
Doc 632 (Apr. 26, 1993).
16 See Chandler, supra note 13, at 174 (text was sloppy and ambiguous even where there was
no intended ambiguity).
17 As It Signs Treaty, United States Calls For Global Patent Protection For Biotech, June 8,
1993, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED. See also Ratification Sought for the Convention on
Biological Diversity, 5 DEPT. OF STATE DIsPATCH 16 (statement of Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor
to the Dept. of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Apr. 12,1994). A draft
of the United States "interpretative statement" is set forth in the Appendix to Mr. Wirth's
testimony.
18 Major industrialized nations like Japan, Germany, Britain and France had signed the Con-
vention and the Clinton Administration believed that in order to retain American access to
genetic material in developing countries, the United States had to sign the Convention as well.
The Clinton Administration also felt that the wording of the Convention, particularly with re-
gard to intellectual property rights, had to be clarified and that as a signatory to the Convention,





vention. First, acknowledging that loss of biodiversity was an impor-
tant threat to the global community, Clinton argued that the
Convention was a means of effectively safeguarding biodiversity. 19
Second, Clinton argued that the Convention (albeit with certain modi-
fications) would provide net economic benefits to the United States
and would therefore be efficient from an economic point of view.' 0
The United States Senate has yet to ratify the Convention, de-
spite the fact that the Convention entered into force on December 29,
1993 and that the first meeting of the parties was held in late 1994.21
President Clinton submitted the Convention to the Senate on Novem-
ber 19, 1993.22 However, despite being favorably reported by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (by a 16-3 vote)23 and notwith-
standing the backing of a number of important pharmaceutical and
agricultural organizations,24 the Convention did not reach the floor of
the Senate for a vote in 1994. Importantly, concerns about the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the Biodiversity Convention in protecting
biodiversity continue to be raised.26
This Comment will argue that the Biodiversity Convention pro-
vides a solid legal framework for the "efficient" protection of bi-
odiversity, but has several significant deficiencies which must be
19 ",... the treaty is critically important.. .because of what it will do to preserve species."
Remarks on Earth Day, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRns. Doc. 632 (Apr. 26, 1993).
20 Id. at 633 ("....the treaty is critically important to the future.. .because of opportunities it
offers for cutting-edge companies whose research creates new medicines, new products and new
jobs" and "the agreement protects both American interests and the world environment").
21 Biodiversity: Treaty Enters Into Force Eighteen Months After Its Signing At 1992 Earth
Summit, Dec. 30, 1994, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED. The parties met from Nov. 28,1994
to Dec. 9, 1994 in Nassau, Bahamas. UNEP Selected As Permanent Secretariat For Treaty But
Location Still Unresolved, INT'L ENvTr. REP. (BNA), Dec. 14, 1994, at 1019.
22 139 CoNG. REcQ S16,572 (1993).
23 140 CONG. REC. S14,047 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994). The Convention was reported from the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 11, 1994.
24 Id. A number of organizations announced their general support for the Convention in-
cluding the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion, Merck & Co, Inc., the U.S. Council for International Business, the American Seed Trade
Association, Inc., Archer Daniels Midland Co. and the American Corn Growers Association.
See also 140 CONG. REcQ S15,067-01 (daily ed. Oct. 8,1994) for a more complete list of organiza-
tions supporting the Convention.
25 140 CONG. REQ S15,066-01 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1994).
26 See 140 CONG. REQ S14,050 (daily ed. Oct. 4,1994) for a copy of a letter which was sent to
the Senate Majority Leader on Aug. 5,1994 and signed by thirty-five Senators. This letter raised
a number of concerns with the Biodiversity Convention, including whether the Convention
would impinge on U.S. sovereignty and negatively affect intellectual property rights. See also
140 CONG. REr S13,792 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1994). Senator Helms stated "[i]n particular, I find
the [Cjonvention's treatment of intellectual property rights, finances, voting procedures, technol-
ogy transfer and biotechnology dangerously muddled, vague and disturbing."
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addressed by the Clinton Administration if the Convention is to be
both efficient and effective. To understand this contention, this Com-
ment will: (i) discuss the legal and environmental background behind
the Convention and the financial stakes involved; (ii) highlight the im-
portance and value of biodiversity from a medicinal and agricultural
perspective; (iii) define efficiency and effectiveness in the context of
the Biodiversity Convention; (iv) describe how the establishment of a
sovereign property right in genetic material helps to overcome the
inefficient underpreservation of biodiversity under the current inter-
national legal system; (v) explain why the establishment of an interna-
tional property right by itself is insufficient to efficiently protect
biodiversity; (vi) argue that the Biodiversity Convention establishes an
international public trust for the preservation of biodiversity, but must
be modified to be effective in achieving its goals; and (vii) address the
effectiveness and efficiency of various forms of "trustee compensa-
tion" under this trust for the preservation of biodiversity.
IX. LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE CONVENTION
Prior to the Biodiversity Convention's ratification, there was no
recognized basis under international law for granting a sovereign
property right in unmodified genetic material.27 While commentators
have searched for ways to apply patent law, copyright law, trademark
law and the law of plant breeder's rights to unprocessed genetic mate-
rial, none of these approaches has proved entirely satisfactory.28 A
brief analysis of patent law's application to preserving biodiversity will
shed some light on the difficulties in creating an intellectual property
right in genetic material.
27 See Browning, supra note 13, at 1830 (telling the story of Eli Lilly and Co. and the discov-
ery of two very important drugs from the Madagascaran rosy periwinkle. While Lilly made
millions of dollars, the government of Madagascar received nothing). See also Catherine M.
Valerio Barrad, Comment, Genetic Information and Property Theory., 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1037
(1993) (for a broad discussion of whether and how property theory can be applied to find a
recognizable property interest in one's genetic material).
28 See Michael A. Gollin, An Intellectual Property Rights Framework for Biodiversity Pros-
pecting, in BIODIvERsrrY PROSPECTING: USING GENETC ENGINEERING RESOURCEs FOR SUS-
TAINABLE DEvELOPMENT (Walter Reid et al. eds., 1993). See also Liz Hanellin, Protecting
Plant-Derived Drugs: Patents & Beyond, 10 CARDoZo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 169 (1991) (analyzing
the difficulties which pharmaceutical companies have in obtaining patents on plant-derived
drugs and advocating a new type of intellectual property system to cover plant-derived drugs).
See also Rebecca L. Margulies, Note, Protecting Biodiversity: Recognizing International Intellec-
tual Property Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 14 MIcH. J. INT'L. L. 322 (1993) (addressing




To obtain a patent in most countries, an object must be "useful,
novel and non-obvious." 9 By obtaining a patent, one obtains the ex-
clusive right to make, use, sell or license such object or process for a
fixed period of time.30 The patent system's intellectual legitimacy
rests in part upon (i) Lockean labor theory, which justifies the grant of
a property interest in those whose labor has fundamentally trans-
formed a thing, and (ii) utilitarian theory, which recognizes an optimal
trade-off between an inventor's interest in exploiting his innovation
and society's interest in broadly utilizing this knowledge and which
thus requires that patent rights be limited in duration. Patent law also
requires that all information related to the creation of an object be
clearly disclosed.
Traditional patent theory is not particularly useful in the effort to
preserve biodiversity. First, non-modified genetic material is clearly
"obvious" under current definitions of this word.31 Second, as the vast
majority of the world's species have not been classified, the recogni-
tion of intellectual property rights in these "undiscovered" species
seems incongruous given the patent law information disclosure re-
quirement. Third, the discovery of a new species, while useful, clearly
does not justify the granting of an intellectual property right under the
Lockean labor theory for the owner has done nothing with his labor to
transform the thing. Finally, placing time restrictions on an owner of
biodiversity's right to exploit his intellectual property as required
under the patent system would be counterproductive to the goal of
long-term preservation.
The Biodiversity Convention creates a new type of intellectual
property right whose legitimacy rests on a different basis than tradi-
tional intellectual property rights. For example, while Lockean labor
theory seeks to reward those who expend effort in creating something
new, the philosophy underpinning the Convention seeks to reward
those who exercise forbearance and thus preserve biodiversity. 32 Be-
cause each nation has a sovereign right to develop its property as it
sees fit33 and because as more rain forest is developed, more species
29 See Hanellin, supra note 28 (discussing how U.S. courts have applied the requirements of
these areas of substantive law to unprocessed genetic material).
30 See BLAcK's LAw DIcroONAY 778 (6th ed. 1991).
31 See Hanellin, supra note 21.
32 In submitting the Convention to the Senate, the Clinton Administration expressly sup-
ported this philosophy, stating that the "benefits stemming from the use of genetic resources
should flow back to those nations that act to conserve biological diversity and provide access to
their genetic resources." 103 CONo. Rc. S16,752 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993).
33 Convention, supra note 2, art. 3, 31 IL.M., at 824.
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are lost, those nations which do not develop ecologically-sensitive
areas are sacrificing economic development opportunities for the
preservation of biodiversity. The sacrifice which developing nations
make in forbearing from development arguably equates to the sacri-
fice of expending labor under the Lockean labor theory and therefore,
if it is just to recognize a property right resulting from "fruits of one's
labor," it should be equally just to recognize a property right resulting
from forbearance in this context.
While it is uncertain at this time which property rights among the
"bundle" of possible property rights the Biodiversity Convention rec-
ognizes within sovereign nations, two rights are clearly identifiable -
the right to restrict access to biodiversity and the right to compensa-
tion for use of biodiversity.34 Article 15, paragraph 1 clearly recog-
nizes the sovereign right of nations to "determine access to genetic
resources" and Article 15, paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 require that access
shall be given "upon mutually agreed upon terms," "based upon prior
informed consent" and with benefits of biodiversity shared in a "fair
and equitable way." Unlike other types of intellectual property, the
sovereign right in biodiversity has no time limit to it and presumably
each nation's interest in a specie's genetic matter, unless entirely
alienated, will continue indefinitely.
To understand why the establishment of a sovereign property
right in unmodified genetic material under the Convention is so im-
portant, this Comment will now examine the environmental back-
ground to the Convention and the economic benefits of biodiversity to
mankind.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL BACKGROUND TO THE CONVENTION
Environmental concern about the loss of habitat, and the conse-
quent loss of biodiversity, has been growing during the past thirty
years.35 During this time, a number of ecologically-sensitive areas
have been destroyed due to the severe social and economic pressures
that many developing countries have faced. 6 Tropical rain forests
have been disappearing at a particularly fast rate, estimated to be sev-
34 See Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 31 ILM., at 828.
35 See Edward 0. Wilson, The Diversity of Life (1992); BxowvERsrry (E. 0. Wilson & Fran-
ces M. Peter, eds., 1988).
36 See Kenworthy, supra note 12, at A15 (citing noted biologist E.O. Wilson's estimate that
1.8 percent of the world's rain forest was lost to deforestation each year during the 1980's).
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enteen million hectares per year.37 Major causes of deforestation in-
clude (i) the establishment of farms and cattle ranches, (ii) fuel wood
gathering by peasants and (iii) commercial logging for export.38
Largely because of deforestation, some scientists believe that up to
twenty-five percent of all species on earth today may become extinct
in the next thirty to forty years.39
Mankind's awareness of the extent of the biodiversity on earth
has risen over time as well. During the past twenty years, scientists
have continued to upwardly revise their estimates of the number of
species on Earth.40 As these estimates have risen, the percentage of
the Earth's species catalogued has fallen. The absolute number of
species catalogued - 1.4 million - is tiny in comparison to the perhaps
thirty million species in existence.4' Of the number catalogued, scien-
tists have thoroughly "researched" only eleven hundred of the forty
thousand plants with possible medicinal or nutritional value for
humans.42
Over fifty percent of the world's biodiversity is located in the rain
forests of the world and much of it may be found in insects and small
plants.43 For example, there are close to three hundred thousand spe-
cies of beetle.' As a rule, the smaller the size of an animal or plant
37 Brian F. Chase, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Legality of Unilateral Attempts to
Promote Sustainable Development Under the GATT, 17 HASnTNGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 349,
352 (1994).
38 Id. at 356-361.
39 Julie B. Bloch, Preserving Biological Diversity in the United States: The Case for Moving to
an Ecosystems Approach to Protect the Nation's Biological Wealth, 10 PACE ENv-r.- L. Rnv. 175,
194 (1992). The rate of biodiversity loss is believed to be faster today than at any time since the
dinosaurs became extinct sixty-five million years ago. Ratification Sought for the Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra note 17.
40 See Robert M. May, How Many Species Inhabit the Earth, ScL AM., Oct. 1992, at 42. May
notes that while fifty percent of the world's birds were known by 1845 and only a few new birds
are added each year, only fifty percent of the world's arthropods were known in 1960 and sixty-
five thousand species have been added since that date. Presumably, we have just scratched the
surface in identifying species which are very small.
41 Robert M. Adams, Smithsonian Horizons: Can we find a way to balance the survival of
endangered species with the livelihoods of people?, SMrrHSouw, Mar. 1992. May, supra note 40,
at 42. Estimates of the number of species in the world runs as high as one hundred million.
Kenworthy, supra note 12, at A15.
42 Kirsten Peterson, Comment, Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing Countries.,
33 HAav. INT'L L.J. 277 (1992) (quoting Peter R. Principle, Economic Significance of Plants and
Plant-Derived Drugs, 3 ECON. & MED. PLANT RnsEAnca 1, 5, 9 (H. Wagner et al., eds., 1989)).
43 Kenworthy, supra note 12, at A15 (quoting noted biologist E.O. Wilson, who calls the
tropical rain forests the "central treasure house of the world's biodiversity"). May, supra note
40, at 45 (nine hundred thousand of the world's 1.5 to 1.8 million recorded species are insects).
44 See May, supra note 40, at 45 (given 1.4 million species and fact that one in five identified
species are beetles, close to three hundred thousand species must be beetles).
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family, the larger the number of different species.45 Many species are
found only in very small geographical areas and have evolved differ-
ently from related species due to specific variations in local conditions.
Through evolution, individual species have evolved unique chemical
defenses to the threats around them. The uniqueness in chemical
make-up between seemingly similar species is what drives the value of
biodiversity from a commercial perspective. 46
As estimates of Earth's biodiversity have risen, environmentalists
have become aware that biodiversity is very fragile and easily de-
stroyed. Scientists believe that for every twenty thousand acres of
rain forest developed, approximately six hundred species are made ex-
tinct.47 As well, scientists have realized that the amount of land con-
served does not directly correlate with the amount of biodiversity
preserved.48 To reduce the influence of non-native ecosystems (and
thus maximize levels of biodiversity), buffers must be established
around protected areas and protected areas must be large enough in
size to ensure ecosystem viability.49
Having briefly examined the nature, extent and rapid loss of the
world's biodiversity, this Comment will now address the tangible ben-
efits to mankind of preserving biodiversity. These benefits lie chiefly
in the areas of agriculture and medicine.
V. THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF BIODIVERSrTY FROM AN
AGRICULTURAL & MEDICINAL PERSPECTIVE
The existence of plant biodiversity plays a crucial role in main-
taining the world's food supplies. While fewer than twenty plant spe-
45 Id. at 48.
46 But see Karen Anne Goldman, Note, Compensation for Use of Biological Resources Under
the Convention on Biological Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation Measures and Competi-
tiveness of the Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAW & POt'Y INT'L Bus. 695, 717 (1994) (noting that
"while a highly valuable portion of a species' DNA may be unique, nearly identical sequences
might also be obtained from another species").
47 Kenworthy, supra note 12, at A15 (citing E.O. Wilson's estimate that 0.5 percent of all rain
forest species (or as many as fifty thousand) are disappearing each year).
48 David Skole & Compton 'nicker, Tropical Deforestation and Habitat Fragmentation in the
Amazon: Satellite Data from 1978 to 1988, 260 Sci. 1905, 1905 (1993). See also Joe Alper, How
to Make the Forests of the World Pay Their Way, 260 Sci. 1895, 1896 (1993) (noting that species
richness and abundance in logged areas was still twenty-five percent lower than in unlogged
control areas).
49 Skole & Tcker, supra note 48, at 1905 (noting the problems of "edge effects" and "is-
lands of biodiversity"). See Alper, supra note 48, at 1895 (noting that even the most unobtrusive
of commercial practices may erode a forest's biodiversity).
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cies produce ninety percent of the world's food supply,50 these species
must be modified continually via cross-breeding with wild strains in
order to both enhance yields and combat disease.51 Importantly, the
existence of a single plant species (out of hundreds of related types)
can play a critical role in the development of a new variety. For exam-
ple, when scientists examined twenty-six thousand samples of wheat
for resistance to the Russian Wheat Aphid, only four species with
resistance to this pest were identified.52
Because of the constant need for new plant varieties, the com-
mercial value of biodiversity from an agricultural perspective is enor-
mous. For example, it is estimated that the exploitation of
biodiversity (via cross-breeding) over the past sixty years in the
United States annually increases the value of the American soybean
and corn crops by roughly three billion and seven billion dollars, re-
spectively.53 However, despite an extensive plant repository system in
the United States (which maintains many non-native species), at least
fifty percent of the world's agricultural biodiversity lies outside of this
country.54
Mankind's understanding of the value of biodiversity to the de-
velopment of new medicines has accelerated during the past few
years. Over one hundred different major drugs have been found in
the rain forests of the world, with the majority of drugs having been
found during the last decade.55 Important rain forest drugs include
vincristine and vinblastine (found in the Madagascaran periwinkle and
used in treating Hodgkin's disease and acute lymphocytic leukemia)
and quinine (found in bark of an evergreen tree in Peru and used to
fight malaria).56 Given the relatively small number of plants evalu-
ated to date for medicinal uses, the potential value of new drugs de-
50 Howard G. Buffett, Senate Inaction Threatens Biodiversity Treaty, ST. Louis Posr-DIs-
PATCH, Aug. 31, 1994, at 7D.
51 Id. See also Jack R. Kloppenburg, Fntsr rTm SEED: Tim PoLrrCAL ECONOMY OF
PLiANT BIoTEcHNoLoY 1492-2000 (1988) (discussing the extent and location of genetic "store-
houses" for common plants (like wheat, etc.)).
52 140 CONG. REC. S14,053 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
53 Ratification Sought for the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 17 (experts esti-
mate that biodiversity adds a value of about three billion dollars to the eleven billion dollar
annual soybean crop and about seven billion dollars to the eighteen billion dollar annual corn
crop).
54 140 CONG. REc. S14,053 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994). Ninety-nine percent of American crop
land is planted with species that originate outside of the United States.
55 Approximately forty-one percent of all our medicines are derived from living things. Sam
Thernstrom, Jungle Fever, NEw REPuBLic, Apr. 19, 1993, at 12-13.
56 Id. at 12-13; Browning, supra note 13, at 1829.
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rived from rain forest plants may be immense.57 However, producing
a new, commercially-available rain forest drug is very expensive and
may take many years due to the long research and development ef-
forts involved.5" As well, laboratory synthesis of a new compound can
be extremely difficult and therefore, many biotechnology companies
must successfully cultivate a particular species in order to bring a new
drug to market.59
Indigenous groups have played a major role in discovering new
drugs in the rain forest.60 Seventy-five commercially available drugs
(or seventy-five percent of all drugs derived from rain forest inputs)
have been found with the help of local tribes.61 Many indigenous
groups have long used certain plants for medicinal purposes. Their
pharmacological knowledge, albeit primitive, has enabled researchers
to more readily identify useful medicinal "needles" in the biodiversity
"haystack" of the rain forest.62 Absent the aid of indigenous groups,
it is estimated that for every one commercially-successful drug, at least
five thousand species must be tested.63
In summary, despite the large amount of time and resources
which may be required to find commercially useful biodiversity, such
biodiversity clearly has great potential economic value. Given the
rapid loss of biodiversity, however, the question remains whether the
Convention is an "efficient" and "effective" means of preserving bi-
odiversity. To answer this question, one must first define the terms
"efficient" and "effective."
57 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. See also Ratification Sought for the Convention
on Biological Diversity, supra note 17 (noting that plant species provide the active ingredient for
twenty-five percent of the prescription drugs sold in the United States, with an annual market
value in excess of ten billion dollars). But see Peter Huber, Biodiversity vs. Bioengineering?,
FORBEs, Oct. 26, 1992, at 266 (suggesting that the economic value of the rain forest's genetic
material may be overstated).
58 See Aia Sittenfeld & Rodrigo Gomez, Biodiversity Prospecting by INBIO, in BioniVERS-
rry PRosPEcTrNG: USING GENETIC ENGINEERING RESOURCES FOR SusTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT 75 (Walter Reid et al. eds., 1993) (noting that the average cost of bringing a new drug to
market is two hundred and thirty million dollars and that a drug takes nearly ten years to go
from source to market).
59 See Browning, supra note 13, at 1830 (in order to create a sufficient supply of vincristine
and vinblastine, Eli Lilly & Co. had to set up rosy periwinkle farms in Madagascar).
60 See Peterson, supra note 42.
61 Peterson, supra note 42, at 277 (quoting Steven R. King, The Source of Our Cures, CuL-
TuwRA SutvIvAL Q., Summer 1991, at 9).
62 One pharmaceutical company, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, specifically focuses its drug de-
velopment strategy on how indigenous groups use plants for medicinal purposes. Shaman
Pharmaceuticals Supports Biodiversity Convention, Bus_.sswmn, April 21, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS.
63 Peterson, supra note 42, at 277 n.30.
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VI. "EFFICIENCY" & "EFFEcrIvENEss" DEFINED
There are two major views of economic efficiency which could be
applied in analyzing the Biodiversity Convention - Pareto efficiency
and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.64 A Pareto efficient (or Pareto superior)
agreement is a voluntary agreement which enhances the utility of at
least one party to the agreement without diminishing the utility of an-
other party.65 The concept of Pareto efficiency has two significant
drawbacks in the context of the Biodiversity Convention. First, if con-
stituencies like the biotechnology industry are considered "parties" to
the Convention, then it is hard to argue that any change to the current
international intellectual property rights regime (which benefits the
biotechnology industry greatly) is Pareto efficient because any grant
of a property right in unmodified genetic material will make these par-
ties worse off (at least in the short run). Second, and more impor-
tantly, Pareto efficiency is typically based on the non-monetary
concept of "utility. '66 Utility is defined as the sum total of an individ-
ual's "happiness," is virtually impossible to quantify and is a function
of personal preferences. 67 In general, any agreement which is volun-
tarily entered into is Pareto efficient by definition, because, absent an
enhancement in each signatory's utility, the agreement would not be
signed. By this logic, the Biodiversity Convention is "Pareto efficient"
(at least upon the signatories) and there is a rebuttable presumption
that the Convention is "Pareto optimal" (which is to say that there is
no superior agreement possible between the signatories).
The Kaldor-Hicks view of efficiency offers a better mechanism
for analyzing the Biodiversity Convention because it does not require
that each party be at least as well off under the Convention as under
the current regime nor does it rely on the non-monetary notion of
utility.68 Instead, the Kaldor-Hicks view posits that an agreement is
(i) efficient if, after the agreement, the collective wealth of the parties
is enhanced and (ii) optimally efficient if, after the agreement, no
modification to the agreement will further enhance the collective
wealth of the parties.69 Determining whether collective wealth is en-
hanced may be difficult, given the problem of idiosyncratic value and
the fact that all parties affected by a transaction may not be voluntary
64 RICHARD PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-14 (4th ed. 1992).
65 Id. at 13.
66 See ROBERT COOTER & THoMAs ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMIcS 49-50 (1988).
67 STEVEN T. CALL & WILuAM L. HOLAHAN, MICROECONOMICS 492 (1983).
68 POSNER, supra note 64, at 13-14.
69 PosNER, supra note 64, at 13-14.
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participants. However, despite its limitations, the concept of wealth
enhancement is a better tool than "utility" because it provides in the-
ory a market-based measure against which different provisions of the
Convention may be analyzed.
The concept of "effectiveness," like the concept of "efficiency,"
has two readily apparent interpretations in the context of the Conven-
tion's goal of "preserving biodiversity." One could measure the "ef-
fectiveness" of the Convention or provisions of the Convention by
determining the degree of biodiversity lost after its enactment. If little
or no biodiversity is lost, then from this absolutist perspective, the
Convention is effective. Were this definition adopted, then there
would be no way that the Convention could be both economically effi-
cient and environmentally effective unless, as some commentators
suggest, an infinite value is assigned to the preservation of each spe-
cies.70 If an infinite value is assigned to the preservation of each spe-
cies, then any destruction of an ecologically sensitive area is
economically inefficient as the value from the alternative use of such
area will be less than the value of the species destroyed. However,
assigning an infinite value to the preservation of biodiversity in rela-
tion to development projects in the developing world seems impracti-
cal as, notwithstanding international efforts, significant amounts of
biodiversity will be lost in the future. The important policy question is
how can mankind design a legal regime which helps to protect the
most valuable aspects of the world's biodiversity?
To this end, a better definition of "effectiveness" explicitly con-
templates an optimal ("efficient") level of preservation and focuses on
how well a particular legal regime is able to achieve this efficient end.
This approach concentrates on implementation issues (such as how
compensation under the Convention should be allocated), because, as
an analysis of the Convention will show, a seemingly efficient legal
framework may not be effectively implemented, and thus, inefficient
outcomes may occur.
This Comment will now discuss why underpreservation of bi-
odiversity occurred under the pre-Convention legal regime and apply
the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to argue that the Convention's
grant of a sovereign property right in unmodified genetic material en-
hances global economic efficiency.
70 See Bryan G. Norton, On the Inherent Danger of Undervaluing Species (Mar. 1983)(un-
published working paper, Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland) (ar-




VII. THE UNDERPRESERVATION OF BIODIVRSTY-A
"COMMONS" PROBLEM
The problem of conserving biodiversity in a world without intel-
lectual property protection for genetic resources is a "commons"
problem. 71 A "commons" is typically an area of land, air or water
which is owned communally by a group. In the absence of strict and
enforced regulation limiting access to and use of the "commons," ra-
tional action by individual members of the group will create a "com-
mons" problem.
Traditional "commons" problems have included the depletion of
fisheries, the overgrazing of animals on common lands and air pollu-
tion.' "Commons" problems traditionally occur when an individual
actor is able to derive all of the benefits from his action while spread-
ing the cost of such action onto other parties.73 If all of the actors
involved in a "commons" problem pursue the seemingly rational
course of maximizing their individual net economic benefit, overpro-
duction occurs (i.e. production where the marginal benefit is less than
the marginal cost from a collective perspective) and the net economic
rents to be derived from a particular "commons" are eroded down to
nothing.74 "Commons" theorists argue that by converting the "com-
mons" to private property where possible, problems of overproduc-
tion are solved (as each actor fully internalizes the marginal cost of his
actions) and net economic rents return to market levels.75
The biodiversity "common" represents a non-traditional "com-
mons" problem from the perspective of developing countries. Instead
of spreading the marginal cost of preserving biodiversity onto other
parties, each nation must fully internalize this cost (which is the op-
portunity cost of foregone development). More importantly, instead
of fully internalizing the benefit of preserving biodiversity, many de-
veloping nations derive no direct benefit from biodiversity as interna-
71 See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fish-
ery, 62 J. POL ECON. 124 (1954); S. V. Ciracy-Wantrup, "Common Property" As A Concept In
Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RES. J. 713 (1975); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Com-
mons, 142 Sci. 1243 (1968).
72 See Gordon, supra note 71 (for an analysis of the fisheries problem). See Hardin, supra
note 71 (for a brief analysis of the grazing and pollution problems).
73 See Hardin, supra note 71, at 1244.
74 Gordon, supra note 71, at 135.
75 See Gordon, supra note 71, at 135. Commons theorists also note that other actions, such
as strict and enforceable regulation (either formal or informal) which also limit access to the
commons, will help to solve a commons problems.
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tional intellectual property law (prior to the Convention) did not
recognize a property right in unmodified genetic material.76
From the perspective of biotechnology companies, the biodivers-
ity "commons" is more like a traditional "commons" problem. When
a biotechnology company discovers a new drug from the rain forest, in
most cases it derives all of the net benefit from this drug.77 However,
part of the cost inherent in developing the drug-preserving ecologi-
cally-sensitive areas is not incurred by the biotechnology company.
Unlike traditional actors in "commons" situations, biotechnology
companies neither physically destroy the "commons" nor engage in
behavior which results in a situation where the net economic rent
from the "commons" is reduced to zero. Still, by not fully internal-
izing the cost of their behavior, these companies in part help to erode
conservation of ecologically-sensitive areas.
The Biodiversity Convention "solves" the "commons" problem
by recognizing a sovereign property right in biodiversity.78 By grant-
ing this right (which, as noted above, includes the right to condition
access to biodiversity in exchange for compensation), the Convention
allows developing nations to internalize the benefits of preserving bi-
odiversity which heretofore have been impossible to capture. As a
result of internalizing this benefit, the marginal cost of land develop-
ment (which includes the foregone marginal benefit of conservation)
rises and, ceteris paribus, less land development is consequently de-
manded and more biodiversity is preserved.
The grant of a sovereign property right under the Convention is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Under the Convention, the net economic ben-
efit which individual pharmaceutical companies derive (at least in the
short-run) from biodiversity will be reduced, as these institutions will
be forced to make upfront and royalty payments to developing na-
tions. However, the net benefit which developing countries receive
will be higher under the new legal regime and the net long-term bene-
fit to the world community will be higher as more biodiversity is pre-
served. As the value of the new legal regime to developing nations
76 See discussion infra part III (for a discussion of the historical absence of property rights in
unmodified genetic material).
77 But see Merck-INBIO agreement, where analysts speculate that Costa Rica will receive
between one and fifteen percent in royalties on any new drug found within its boundaries. Sarah
A. Laird, Contracts for Biodiversity Prospecting, in BioDIvERsrrY PROSPECTING: UsING GE_
Nm-ic ENGINEERING RESOURCES FOR SusiNABL.E DEvELoPmENT 111 (Walter Reid et al. eds.,
1993). In this transaction, Merck made a one million dollar advanced payment to Costa Rica,
donated chemical extraction equipment worth one hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars and
agreed to train Costa Rican scientists. Goldman, supra note 46, at 720.




and the world community is arguably higher than the cost of the new
regime to biotechnology companies, efficiency is enhanced.
How the sovereign right in biodiversity is interpreted and how
nations internally share the benefits associated with this right will
have an impact on the level of efficiency under the Convention. For
example, if a species lives in two different countries, who owns the
right to exploit this species? 79 Is the right shared? If the right is not
shared equitably, then developing nations will be incented to protect
and research border areas first (so as to "capture" species common to
multiple countries) and, as a result, sub-optimal preservation of bi-
odiversity may occur.80 As well, even if a sovereign right in biodivers-
ity exists, will the benefits associated with exploiting this right actually
filter down to the individuals and groups who are the "agents" of land
development in many developing countries? Will these agents "inter-
nalize" the benefit of land preservation? If benefits from biodiversity
are misaligned with costs of preservation at any societal level, then
sub-optimal preservation will occur.
In summary, by granting a sovereign property right in biodivers-
ity, the Biodiversity Convention arguably increases efficiency from a
Kaldor-Hicks perspective. However, as the next section will show, the
Convention also enhances efficiency in other ways as well.
VIII. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPENSATION
While the single action of granting a sovereign property right in
biodiversity enhances global efficiency, the Biodiversity Convention
also calls upon developed nations to create a multilateral fund to sup-
port the purposes of the Convention and transfer certain intellectual
property rights to developing nations.81 The transfer of funds and in-
tellectual property to developing nations can be thought of as addi-
tional compensation for the preservation of biodiversity. An analysis
of option theory will demonstrate why granting additional compensa-
79 See Peterson, supra note 42. See also Goldman, supra note 46, at 716 (noting that "geo-
graphic distributions of plant and animal species are not limited by national borders").
80 This is a classic "fugitive property" problem. A typical example of the fugitive property
problem is an oil pool which lies beneath several owner's properties. Each owner may attempt
to pre-empt the other adjacent property owners by making uneconomic investments. See
COOTER & UtEN, supra note 66, at 124-35 (discussing the economics of fugitive property).
81 Convention, supra note 2, art. 16, 31 IL.M., at 829; Convention, supra note 2, art. 20, 31
IL.M., at 830-31.
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tion to developing nations may also be necessary to further global
efficiency.8
Because the value of biodiversity is largely speculative in nature,
the value of preserving biodiversity can be compared to holding an
"option" on the future benefits of biodiversity.8 3 While there is no
upfront cost to this option, there is an on-going opportunity cost to the
option which is the cost of foregone economic development. Ele-
ments involved in valuing an option include (i) the probability and
expected size of future cash flow(s), (ii) timing of such cash flows and
(iii) the discount rate ("cost of capital") applied to these cash flows. 4
From a developing nation's perspective, the cost of the option
may outweigh its speculative benefits. Developing nations usually
have very high costs of capital and as a result, the value of a new drug
which may generate cash flows ten years from now may not be partic-
ularly high.85 As well, the absolute size of the royalties which a devel-
oping nation may receive from a new drug is not particularly large in
comparison to the total value which such drug may create.86 Given (i)
the long-time horizon involved in biodiversity prospecting, (ii) the rel-
atively high cost of capital in developing nations and (iii) the relatively
small amounts which these nations will receive in royalties, it may be
efficient (from a local perspective) for developing countries to de-
velop ecologically-sensitive areas rather than preserve them.
From a global perspective, the value of the "biodiversity option"
may outweigh the opportunity cost of foregone development to a par-
ticular developing nation? The international community (and in par-
ticular the developed world) has a lower cost of capital than many
developing nations and will enjoy larger benefits from the exploitation
82 See Michael Gallin, Annex 3 - Convention on Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property
Rights, in BIODIVERSrTY PROSPECrING: UsiNr, GENETIC ENGINEERING RESOURCES FOR SUS-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 299 (Walter Reid et al. eds., 1993) (noting in his analysis of Article 21
& 22 of the Convention that "trade in indigenous resources based on intellectual property rights
will not be sufficient to finance biodiversity conservation").
83 See John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. EcoN. Rn-v. 777, 780 (1967).
84 See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (1991)(refer
to Chapter 21 - Applications of Option Pricing Theory).
85 See MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVLOPMET N TE TmRD WoR 483 (3rd ed.
1985) (noting that many developing nations have high market rates of interest due to the high
premium which many citizens place on current consumption).
86 See Laird, supra note 77, at 111.
87 It is relatively easy to evaluate the economic opportunity cost of foregone development.
For example, it has been estimated that the value of converting one hectare of Peruvian rain
forest to cattle pasture is equal to $6,144. Charles M. Peters et al., Valuation of an Amazonian




of biodiversity than any single country alone will.s As a result, it may
be globally efficient to preserve biodiversity in instances where local
preservation would not make economic sense. By compensating de-
veloping nations via multilateral payments and transfers of intellectual
property, the Biodiversity Convention helps to increase the option
value of biodiversity to the developing world. By increasing this
value, more biodiversity will be preserved and global efficiency should
be enhanced.
Having addressed the ways in which the Convention theoretically
improves economic efficiency, this Comment will now argue that each
nation under the Convention is in effect a trustee of an international
public trust, the corpus of which is such nation's biodiversity and the
beneficiary of which is the international community.
IX. THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION AS AN INTERNATIONAL
PuBLIC TRUST
The historical notion of a "public trust" has its roots in English
common law and is loosely based on earlier Roman law.89 The histor-
ical doctrine posited that certain things - like air, running water, the
ocean - are common to mankind and, therefore, cannot be privately
owned but are held by the sovereign in trust for the benefit of all
citizens.90 The historical doctrine has a largely economic rationale
(the promotion of commerce) and was used primarily by courts to
maintain the navigability of rivers and bays.91
Around 1970, under the leadership of Professor Joseph Sax, ef-
forts were made to "update" the public trust doctrine and transform it
into a tool for the promotion of environmental protection.92 While
much of the modem public trust doctrine is ill-defined (some com-
mentators believe it to be a legal fiction93), at base the doctrine is
rooted in the notion that a great deal of property that is both publicly
88 See TODARO, supra note 85; see also Laird, supra note 77.
89 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 MiaC. L. REv. 471, 475 (1970).
90 Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. Rnv.
239, 250 (1992).
91 Id. at-254 (Cohen notes the irony of how the modem public trust doctrine is being used to
frustrate rather than further commercial interests). See also Ved P. Nanda & William K. Ris, Jr.,
The Public Trust Doctrine" A Viable Approach to International Environmental Protection, 5
EcoL- L. Q. 291, 302 (1976).
92 See Sax, supra note 89.
93 See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Re-
sources: Questions the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631,715 (1986) (noting that many
critics believe that the doctrine has weak historical underpinnings).
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and privately owned is bundled with an extensive set of pre-existing
communal rights.94 As the takings clause of the Constitution protects
the property rights of minorities from action by the majority, the pub-
lic trust doctrine protects the communal property rights of the major-
ity from actions by a minority.95 In theory, the public trust doctrine
states a cause of action (which may rest in the government or in pri-
vate parties) for any use of a property which infringes on a pre-ex-
isting communal right.
The Biodiversity Convention has many of the indicia of a public
trust.96 The purpose of the trust is "to preserve biodiversity. '97 The
trust property is the biodiversity of the world, and by logical exten-
sion, the habitats of the world in which biodiversity resides. Trust
property may be alienated,98 however, use of trust property is re-
stricted to those uses which do not materially affect biodiversity. Trust
property may be harmed in certain circumstances, but only if the harm
is minimized and is "necessary." 99 The beneficiaries of the trust are
the international community and perhaps future generations. 1°° The
trustees (who may or may not have legal title to the trust property)
are the sovereign nations in which trust property is located.
The Biodiversity Convention is more of a "true" public trust than
many of the public trusts that environmentalists have tried to judi-
cially establish in the United States in the past twenty years, because
the Convention specifically looks at the "totality of public interests" in
94 See Sax, supra note 89, at 478.
95 Cohen, supra note 90, at 245.
96 In fact, during his Earth Day speech when he announced U.S. support for the Biodiversity
Convention, President Clinton used the language of trust law to find a duty to preserve nature
("[the bounty of nature] is a gift from God that we hold in trust for future generations. Preserv-
ing our heritage, enhancing it, and passing it along is a great purpose worthy of a great people").
Remarks on Earth Day, 29 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Docs. 631 (Apr. 26,1993). See also Nanda &
Ris, supra note 91 (applying the public trust doctrine to international environmental issues).
97 There must be a public trust purpose for a public trust to be found. Lazarus, supra note
93, at 651. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, 31 I.L.M., at 823 (purpose of Convention).
98 Lazarus, supra note 93, at 653.
99 Lazarus, supra note 74, at 652. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 14, § 1(a), 31 I.L.M., at
827 (calling on parties to evaluate and minimize effect of any proposed action that might impact
on biodiversity).
100 See Convention, supra note 2,31 I.L.M., at 823 (the contracting parties state in the pream-
ble that they are "[dietermined to conserve and sustainably use biological diversity for the bene-
fit of present and future generations"). See also EDrH BROWN WEIss, IN FAINuss To FuTURE
GENERATrONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL Eo-
urry (1989); Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Eq-
uity, 11 EcoL- L. Q. 495 (1984); Edith Brown Weiss, Developments in the Law - International
Environmental Law, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1533-1535 (1991).
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the preservation of biodiversity.101 Since such interests are not en-
tirely environmental, environmental interests must be weighed with
and balanced against other public interests such as economic growth,
preservation of indigenous cultures, etc. This balancing act is seen
within the Convention, which recognizes the sovereign right to eco-
nomic development in Article 2 but which also requires states to mini-
mize the environmental impact of proposed projects in Article 14.
While the Convention's attention to the "totality of public interest"
may disappoint some environmentalists, it enhances the Convention's
legal legitimacy because it makes the Convention look more like an
historical public trust. l'
U.S. courts have been hesitant to adopt the modem public trust
doctrine, in part because (i) plaintiffs have been unable to demon-
strate a prior reservation by the sovereign of certain communal rights
in property'0 3 and (ii) restrictions on the private use of property often
appear like governmental "takings."'1 4 The Biodiversity Convention
avoids the first critique of the public trust doctrine because the public,
communal rights in biodiversity under the Convention were explicitly
created at the same time that the sovereign property rights in genetic
material were recognized. 10 5 The Biodiversity Convention also side-
steps the issue of an international "taking" from developing countries
as well, because compensation, in the form of multi-lateral payments
and intellectual property transfers, (i) exists, (ii) is on-going and (iii) is
101 Cohen, supra note 90, at 254 (noting that in contrast to the historical doctrine, modem
public trust doctrine severely frowns on the commercial use of trust property and this seemingly
undermines the legitimacy of the modem doctrine).
102 See Lazarus, supra note 93, at 712 (noting that the public trust doctrine may not be a
particularly effective doctrine for environmental protection because judges often balance com-
peting public interests in applying it). See also Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revi-
sionist View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark
Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1209, 1227 (1991) (noting that
though well-intentioned, Sax's public trust doctrine may get in the way of more far-reaching
strategies for environmental protection).
103 See Summa Corp. v. CaL ex reL State Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751, 1758 (1984) (refus-
ing to find a public trust easement over tidelands property owned by persons whose predeces-
sors-in-interest had their interest confirmed without mention of such easement in federal patent
proceedings taken pursuant to Act of 1851).
104 See Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979) (refusing to find that a governmental
regulation which opened an otherwise private pond to public access was immune to a takings
challenge).
105 See Convention, supra note 2, art. 8,31 I.L.M., at 825; Convention, supra note 2, art. 14,31
I.L.M., at 827 (implicitly creating these rights and duties despite language to the contrary (i) in
the preamble of the Convention "reaffirming" sovereign rights over biodiversity and (ii) in Arti-
cle 20, which states that economic and social development and the eradication of poverty are the
overriding priorities of developing nations (the so-called "right to development")).
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a prerequisite for the continuing obligation of developing states to
preserve biodiversity.10 6
The outline of an international public trust clearly exists under
the Convention. However, as the next section will show, there is a
large flaw in the structure of the Convention - the lack of liability rules
- which may seriously diminish its effectiveness.
X. THE NEED FOR LIABILrrY RULES TO CREATE AN EFFECrIVE
PUBLIC TRUST
Professor Sax has posited that for a public trust doctrine to be
effective in protecting the environment, it must be able to meet three
criteria.1" 7 First, there must be "some concept of a legal right in the
general public."10 8 While the Biodiversity Convention does not con-
template the right of individuals to enforce the Convention, 109 Article
.27 does explicitly recognize a cause of action for participating govern-
ments and such cause of action (depending on the circumstances) may
be resolved via arbitration or the International Court of Justice.110
Second, the doctrine "must be capable of an interpretation consistent
with contemporary concerns for environmental quality."'' The defi-
nition of biodiversity under the Convention is very broad and the
Convention is clearly open to evolving interpretations of what consti-
tutes the "preservation of biodiversity." Thirdly, the doctrine must
"be enforceable against the government.""' 2 While there is an inter-
national dispute resolution mechanism contemplated under Article
27, there is no explicit enforcement mechanism or cause of action
under the Convention against a government which destroys its own
106 Convention, supra note 2, art. 20, 31 I.L.M., at 830; see also Barton, supra note 13, at 774.
107 Sax, supra note 89, at 474.
108 Sax, supra note 89, at 474.
109 See 140 CONG. Rac. S14,053 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (in a letter to the Senate Majority
Leader, the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture and State clearly state that the Convention
does not, "expressly or by implication, create a private right of action under which a private
person or group may challenge domestic laws and regulations as inconsistent with the Conven-
tion"). Even though the Convention may not create a private cause of action, it is worth noting
that several federal statutes already prohibit the destruction of biodiversity by the United States
government and that such statutes may serve as the basis for a private cause of action. See Sierra
Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
110 Convention, supra note 2, art. 27, 31 I.L.M., at 834; Convention, supra note 2, Annex II,
31 I.L.M., at 839.
111 Sax, supra note 89, at 474.




(domestic) biodiversity.1i 3 From both a formalistic and practical per-
spective, this is clearly where the Convention needs modification.
While developing nation "trustees" may be unable to compel per-
formance (i.e. compensation) from the developed world, these nations
have a sufficient remedy under the Biodiversity Convention if the de-
veloped world breaches its obligations. Under Article 20, the "extent
to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their
commitments under this Convention will depend on the effective im-
plementation by developed country Parties of their commitments
under this Convention related to financial resources and transfer of
technology...,,114 If the developed world does not fully provide these
resources, then developing nations need only partially perform their
obligation to preserve biodiversity and may develop those areas which
they are no longer obligated to preserve. This is clearly a sufficient
rescissory remedy because, post-breach, the developing world will be
in the same economic position that they were before the
Convention.1 15
In contrast, the developed world cannot enforce the Biodiversity
Convention against the developing world and there is no sufficient
remedy for the non-performance of developing nations. Article 3 spe-
cifically reaffirms the right of sovereign nations to exploit their re-
sources pursuant to their own environmental policies and Article 20,
paragraph 4 recognizes that the paramount duty of developing nations
is economic and social development and the eradication of poverty
(the so-called "right to development"). 16 Based on the language of
these Articles, only the most environmentally-wasteful, economically-
inefficient development programs would yield to an action brought
under the Convention. The only penalty which developing nations
currently face under the Convention for neglecting their trusteeship
113 See Lee P. Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and Cultural Diversity: Emerging Rec-
ognition of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems Under International Environmental Law, 59
TENN. L.RAv. 735, 743 (1992) (quoting Michael Glennon, Has International Law Failed The
Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 34 (1990), who states "a global environmental right arises in
connection with a global environmental resource. It refers to the right of all states to expect that
resources will be protected by the state in which it is found. States are trustees, responsible for
the protection of species within their territories. That obligation runs to the international com-
munity as a whole; any state should be regarded as suffering legally cognizable injury when that
obligation is breached by another state").
114 Convention, supra note 2, art. 20, § 4, 31 I.L.M., at 831.
115 Rescissory damages are "those which contemplate the return of the injured party to the
position he occupied before he was induced by wrongful conduct to enter into the transaction."
BLAcK's LAw DICIONARY 273 (6th ed. 1991).
116 Convention, supra note 2, art. 3,31 I.L.M., at 834; Convention, supra note 2, art. 20, § 4,31
I.L.M., at 831. The sovereign right to development is also found in the United Nations Charter.
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duties is the withdrawal of future multi-lateral payments and new
transfers of technology.'17
The withdrawal of future compensation is an insufficient remedy
for the developed world. Payments made by the developed world
should be viewed as installment payments made over a period of time
for the preservation of biodiversity, not as annual rents paid to fore-
stall the destruction of biodiversity in a given year. There is no mean-
ingful benefit to the developed world if, for example, after receiving
five years of compensation, a developing nation decides (via develop-
ment) to destroy a portion of its biodiversity. As noted above, ex-
ploiting the pharmacological value of biodiversity takes many years of
testing and research.118 Therefore, only if biodiversity is preserved
over the long-term will the international community benefit from its
preservation and benefit from compensation paid under the Biodiver-
sity Convention.
A meaningful liability structure needs to be created if the Bi-
odiversity Convention is to be effective. Under the ideal structure,
developing countries would still be able to destroy biodiversity in cer-
tain circumstances but would have to make restitution 1 9 to the devel-
oped world. At a minimum, such restitution should equal part or all
of the prior compensation received. By requiring restitution, this legal
structure would force those nations which destroy biodiversity to fully
internalize the cost of its destruction and, as a result, a more optimal
amount of biodiversity would be preserved.120 As noted above, the
Convention expressly contemplates instances where biodiversity will
be destroyed. However, absent a strong liability structure, there will
be a relatively small price to pay for such destruction and the goal of
efficient preservation will be seriously undermined.
The Biodiversity Convention under Article 14, paragraph 2 al-
ready contemplates that a liability structure be established for those
states who destroy (even if unintentionally) the biodiversity of other
signatories.' 21 By striking the phrase "except where such liability is a
purely internal matter" from Article 14, paragraph 2, the international
117 Although conceivably other international measures beyond the four comers of the Con-
vention, such as sanctions, could be imposed.
118 Sittenfeld & Gomez, supra note 58, at 75.
119 Restitution, as a legal concept, has several different meanings. See DAN B. DOBBS, DoBas
LAw OF REMEDmES, § 4.1(1) (2nd ed. 1993). Restitution in this context means placing the devel-
oped world back in the position they were in prior to the breach.
120 By requiring restitution, the Convention would eliminate the possibility of developing na-
tions enjoying unjust enrichment.




community could explicitly create the foundation for a binding liabil-
ity structure.122
XI. IssUEs RELATED TO THE EFFICIENCY & EFFECTIrVENESS OF
THE BIODrvERsrrY CONVENTION
As this Comment has endeavored to demonstrate, the overall
structure of the Biodiversity Convention - which includes the creation
of a sovereign property right in biodiversity coupled with an interna-
tional public trust limiting the exercise of this sovereign right - is effi-
cient in theory from a global perspective. Beyond modifying the
Convention to provide for a liability structure, several other steps
need to be taken for efficient and effective preservation. These issues
include (i) sufficient funding for the Convention, (ii) appropriate allo-
cation of compensation to developing nations and (iii) appropriate
forms of compensation.
A. Sufficient Funding for the Convention
For the Biodiversity Convention to be effective, the developed
world must provide compensation to the developing world which is
sufficient to incent those nations to meaningfully preserve biodivers-
ity. Therefore, total compensation (via multilateral payments, trans-
fers of intellectual property rights and private payments by
biotechnology companies for access to and exploitation of biodivers-
ity) plus other benefits of habitat conservation (like tourism, non-inva-
sive harvesting, etc.), 23 should be at least equal to the option cost of
biodiversity from a developing nation perspective, in those instances
where (i) the option value of biodiversity does not exceed the option
cost from a developing nation perspective and (ii) the option value of
biodiversity from a global perspective is greater than the option cost
from a developing nation perspective. 2 4 Clearly, there are problems
122 See Convention, supra note 2, art. 14, § 2,31 I.L.M., at 828. Conceivably, this modification
to the Convention could create liability on the part of developed nations like the United States
which destroy biodiversity. However, under the proposed liability structure, damages would
equal zero for nations like the United States which do not receive compensation under the
Convention.
123 Economists have estimated other values which result from the preservation of habitat. In
one study, it was concluded that the present value of benefits associated with the sustainable
harvest of fruit, latex and lumber from one acre of rain forest in Peru was equal to $6,820.
Peters, supra note 87, at 656. See also JoHN A. DIXON & PAUL B. SmERMAN, ECONOMICS OF
PROTECTED AREAs: A NEW LOOK AT BEEFMrs AND COsTS (1990).
124 From an algebraic perspective, if OV(G) equals the option value from a global perspec-
tive, TC equals total compensation to a particular developing country, OB equals other benefits
from habitat conservation to a particular developing country, OV(DN) equals the option value
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of accurately calculating the various costs and benefits associated with
the preservation of biodiversity from both a global and a local per-
spective. For example, it is very difficult to estimate the magnitude
and timing of future biotechnology discoveries. While these problems
are substantial in nature, they must be addressed if the Biodiversity
Convention is to provide adequate incentives for the efficient preser-
vation of biodiversity.
In AGENDA 21, the United Nations Conference on Economic
Development (UNCED) estimates that the cost of implementing just
the monitoring provisions of the Biodiversity Convention will exceed
five billion dollars per annum during the period 1993-2001.1'5 The
cost of fully implementing the Convention - including the establish-
ment of a multi-lateral fund and transfers of technology - has not yet
been estimated, but could easily double UNCED's current cost
estimate.126
The parties to the Convention recently decided to utilize the
Global Environment Facility (GEF) as a temporary funding mecha-
nism for the Convention.127 The GEF will not only finance projects
aimed at protecting biodiversity, but will also support efforts to deal
with climate change, pollution of international waters and ozone de-
pletion.128 For its first three years of operation, international donors
have agreed to provide two billion dollars, of which the United States
pledged four hundred and twenty million dollars. 2 9
To date, the United States Congress has allocated just ninety mil-
lion dollars to the GEF.130 As noted above, if the United States and
of biodiversity for a particular developing nation and OC(DN) equals the option cost for a par-
ticular developing nation, then in those instances where (i) OV(DN) <= OC(DN) and (ii)
OV(G) >= OC(DN), compensation should be given such that following equation, OV(G) >= TC
+ OB >= OC(DN), is true.
125 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PRocEEDrNos 430 (Nicholas A. Robinson et al. eds., 1992).
126 See Gallin, supra note 82, at 299 (noting in his analysis of Article 21 & 22 of the Conven-
tion that "the cost of preserving biodiversity may be tens of billions of dollars"); Gerald Piel,
Agenda 21: Sustainable Development, Sci. AM., Oct. 1992, at 128 (estimating that the cost of all
of the Rio treaties may exceed six hundred billion dollars per annum, of which one hundred and
twenty-five billion dollars will be supplied by developed countries).
127 Global Environmental Facility To Continue As 'Interim' Financing Source For Projects,
INT'L ENvr~. REP. (BNA), Dec. 14, 1994, at 1019.
128 Nicholas Van Praag, The Global Environmental Facility: Instrument Establishing - Intro-
ductory Note, 33 I.L.M. 1273, 1273 (1994).
129 Id. at 1274.
130 Act of Aug. 23, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-306, 108 Stat. 1608 (1994). This allocation does not
include any amounts which might be required for the United States to protect its own biodivers-
ity. Such amounts could be considerable, in light of what conceivably could be required to pro-
tect U.S. biodiversity. See Charles C. Mann and Mark L. Plummer, The High Cost of




other developed nations fail to fully perform under the Convention,
the developing world is excused from performance as well. 131 More-
over, if the Convention is not properly funded, it is understandable
that many developing nations may choose the benefit of economic de-
velopment over the burden of preserving biodiversity. In summary,
absent proper compensation, inefficient conservation of biodiversity
from a global perspective will occur.
B. APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF COMPENSATION
Compensation under the multi-lateral fund contemplated in Arti-
cle 21 should be allocated to developing nations based on biodiversity
measures. The issue of how resources are to be allocated under the
Convention has yet to be decided. 32 For efficient preservation of bi-
odiversity to occur, funding priority should go to those areas that (i)
have the largest quantity of biodiversity, (ii) have highly unique forms
of biodiversity and/or (iii) are facing the greatest development pres-
sures. Developed nations must ensure that compensation is allocated
via these or similar biodiversity measures and not by other, non-bi-
odiversity measures such as population or land area.133
C. APPROPRIATE FORMS OF COMPENSATION
In a world without transaction costs, the most efficient means of
providing compensation for the preservation of biodiversity is through
cash payments. By using cash, the costs of preserving biodiversity are
clearly understood and the recipients are able to maximize their utility
by choosing how to spend these payments.134 The Biodiversity Con-
vention, in addition to mandating monetary transfers to a multi-lateral
fund, also calls for transfers of intellectual property rights relevant (i)
to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity ("conservation
technology") or (ii) to the use of genetic material ("genetic engineer-
ing technology") under Article 16.'35 There is an obvious efficiency
justification for some conservation technology transfers, but there is
131 Convention, supra note 2, art. 20, § 4, 31 LLM., at 831.
132 See Convention, supra note 2, art. 21, § 2, 31 I.L.M., at 831.
133 See WALTEr V. REro Er. Al., BIODIvERsrTY INDICATORS FOR POUCYMAKERS (1993)
(proposing twenty-two indicators to help planners establish biodiversity priorities).
134 See Posner, supra note 64, at 467-468 (discussing the utility or disutility of making uncon-
ditioned cash payments to welfare recipients).
135 Convention, supra note 2, art. 16, §§ 1, 3, 31 .L.M., at 829. "Conservation technologies" is
a broad concept which may include anything from high-yielding seeds to energy co-generation
facilities.
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no apparent efficiency rationale for any genetic engineering technol-
ogy transfers.
The efficiency justification for the transfer of conservation tech-
nologies is that significant transaction costs may exist in the dissemi-
nation of cash payments to those local actors who have the power to
take actions which reduce the pressure to developed fragile habi-
tats. 36 Transaction costs include (i) identifying local actors and (ii)
monitoring whether compensation given to local actors goes toward
measures that promote conservation. Given the large number of par-
ties who could take conservation actions directly or indirectly, transac-
tions costs may be extremely high.
A more efficient approach in situations where transaction costs
are high may be to transfer conservation technologies to the develop-
ing world directly. By transferring these rights, the cost of conserva-
tion technologies to the local end user will be lower than before and as
a result, more conservation technology will be demanded and more
preservation will occur. To minimize negative incentive effects, how-
ever, appropriate payments from the multi-lateral fund should be
made to the owners of transferred conservation technology. 137 Fur-
ther, the transfer of conservation technology should only occur when
(i) transaction costs in disbursing such technology are high and (ii) the
net benefit of the transfer (after taking into account compensation to
the technology's owner) is positive. It seems clear, however, that one
way or another conservation technologies need to get into the hands
of local users if the Convention's dual goals of economic development
and biodiversity preservation are to be achieved. 38
In contrast to the transfer of certain types of conservation tech-
nology, there is no efficiency justification for the transfer of genetic
engineering technology beyond perhaps encouraging "buy-in"'139
among developing nation elites (scientists, industrialists, etc.), who
will benefit the most from these transfers. Significant transaction
costs do not exist in providing access to genetic engineering technol-
136 See PosiER, supra note 64, at 535-36 (contending that more pressure exists for the crea-
tion of "efficient" rules when transaction costs are high).
137 This approach is consistent with Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Convention which calls for
transfers of technology on "fair and most favourable terms .... consistent with adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights [and].... where necessary, in accordance with
the financial mechanism established by Articles 20 and 21." Convention, supra note 2, art. 16,
§ 2, 31 I.L.M., at 829.
138 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth as Eggshell Vrctim. A Global Perspective on Domestic
Regulation, 102 YALE L. J. 2107, 2121 (1993).
139 "Buy-in" in this context means an enthusiasm for the Convention which leads to a greater




ogy, because there are not a large number of parties involved. Devel-
oping nation governments and corporations can negotiate directly
with the technology owners for rights to use such technology if they
wish.
The inclusion of Article 16, paragraph 3 (which calls for the trans-
fer of genetic engineering technology) in the Convention dispropor-
tionately benefits the more economically advanced nations of the
developing world, such as Brazil, which have the infrastructure to
make use of these transfers. 4 ° The inclusion of this requirement re-
flects the continuing role of dependency theory in the developing
world, which continues to find adherents despite recent economic suc-
cess stories (such as Chile) which have largely rejected this model in
favor of a more free market approach.141 Dependency theorists be-
lieve (i) that the third world's development has been characterized by
the export of raw materials to the industrialized world for processing,
(ii) that this economic relationship has perpetuated the unequal in-
come distributions and the overall levels of poverty which exist in the
third world and (iii) that it is important to break this dependent rela-
tionship by doing more of the value-added processing in the third
world.142 Provisions of the biodiversity treaty which require genetic
engineering transfers to the third world are in line with traditional
dependency thinking.
The United States should attempt to have Article 16, paragraph 3
stricken from the Convention because: (i) transfers of genetic engi-
neering technology do not directly impact the preservation of biotech-
nology; (ii) it is not in the national interest to give up America's "first
mover" advantages in this area;143 (iii) developing nations can cur-
rently license this technology if they wish; and (iv) compensating own-
140 The nations of the developing world are a heterogeneous group with widely differing
levels of per capita income and industrialization. Some biodiversity-rich nations, like Brazil, are
considered "newly industrializing" nations (per capita income equals $5,000), while other nations
like Zaire are considered "low-income" countries (per capita income equals $500). CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACrBOOK 1994 57, 439.
141 The seminal work in the area of dependency theory is FERNANDO HENRiQuE CARDOSO &
ENZO FALETro, DEPENDENCY Am DEVELOPMENr IN LATIN AMERICA (Marjory M. Urquidi
trans., 1979).
142 See Andre Frank, Development of Underdevelopment, in PERsPECrrvEs ON WORLD Pots-
Tics (Michael Smith et al. eds., 1981).
143 ARTHuR A. THOMnSON, JR. & AJ. SnmCKLAND III, STRATEGY FORMULATION AND IM-
PLEMENTATION: TASKs OF TIE GENERAL MANAGER 122 (1992) (noting that a number of com-
mercial advantages accrue to corporations (and nations) who are the first to enter into a line of
business). In biotechnology, the United States has first mover advantages. Goldman, supra note
46, at 698.
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ers of genetic engineering technology would divert funds away from
the Convention's more important conservation initiatives.
XII. CONCLUSION
The political struggle within the United States over the Biodivers-
ity Convention in part is the result of differing notions of economic
efficiency and wealth maximization. Certain segments of the biotech-
nology industry argue that granting a property right in raw genetic
material represents a tax on genetic research, which reduces the
amount of research conducted and number of new drugs found. This
short-term view is only economically optimal from the perspective of
the biotechnology industry because, given (i) the millions of un-
researched species in the world, (ii) the fact that the biotechnology
industry can currently research only a small fraction of these species in
any given year, and (iii) the long time horizon between the research
and commercialization of new drugs, the loss of even half of the
world's biodiversity probably would not financially affect these com-
panies greatly.
In contrast, natural resource economists believe that the lack of a
property right in genetic material results in the underpreservation of
biodiversity and, hence, the non-optimal exploitation of this resource.
Economists view the lack of property rights in raw genetic material as
a "commons" problem, albeit a non-traditional one. By granting a
sovereign property right, the benefit of preserving biodiversity is in-
ternalized within developing nations (who are already bearing the full
cost of preservation) and, as a result, more biodiversity is preserved
and the net value of biodiversity, from a global, Kaldor-Hicks per-
spective, is enhanced.
Granting a sovereign right in genetic material, coupled with ap-
propriately structured multi-lateral compensation, can maximize the
value of biodiversity from a global perspective. Absent compensation
and in spite of having internationally-recognized property rights, some
nations may still not find it in their financial interest to preserve bi-
odiversity given the grave financial and demographic pressures which
they face. To these nations, the option value of biodiversity may be
negative (or, put differently, the opportunity cost of preserving bi-
odiversity may exceed the benefit of preservation). However, from a
global, more long-term perspective, the option value of biodiversity
may be positive and, thus, global subsidies to developing countries via
the compensation structure of the Convention may be efficient.
Biological Diversity
15:636 (1995)
By offering multi-lateral compensation to the developing world in
exchange for the preservation of biodiversity, the Biodiversity Con-
vention creates the outline of an international public trust between
the developing countries as trustees and the international community
as beneficiaries. Significant indicia of a public trust exist, including: a
definable purpose, enforceability on subsequent owners of trust prop-
erty, restrictions on use of trust corpus, etc. In addition, two of the
three requirements for the effective use of a public trust doctrine, as
noted by Professor Sax, - a legal right in the general public and the
ability to interpret the trust in a manner consistent with contemporary
concerns for environmental quality - are met."' Only an enforcement
mechanism (against developing country trustees which fail to carry
out their duties) is currently missing from the Convention and this
omission seriously undermines the otherwise binding language of the
Convention.
To remedy this omission and to create the basis for an effective
international public trust, the United States (prior to ratification)
must ensure that there is a "reciprocity of responsibility" between de-
veloped and developing countries under the Convention. Currently,
under the Biodiversity Convention, the duty of developing countries
to preserve biodiversity is contingent on developed countries provid-
ing "sufficient" compensation and such duty is subordinated to each
nation's so-called "right to development." 45 For the Convention to
work, however, liability rules must be created for developing nations
which receive appropriate compensation but which do not appropri-
ately preserve biodiversity and the so-called "right to development"
must be limited in its scope. If an effective liability structure is not put
in place and if the "right to development" is not limited, then (i) com-
pensation under the Biodiversity Convention will represent little more
than penalty payments by developed nations for past economic devel-
opment and (ii) conservation in developing countries will remain
purely voluntary.146
In an ideal world, total compensation to each developing country
plus other benefits of habitat conservation should be at least equal to
the option cost of biodiversity from a developing nation perspective in
144 Sax, supra note 89, at 474.
145 Convention, supra note 2, art. 20, § 4, 31 I.L.M., at 831.
146 See Jason M. Patlis, Note, The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocok A Prototype for
Financial Mechanisms in Protecting the Global Environment, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.. 181, 229
(1992) (arguing that developed countries benefitted from artificially low costs of development
because of environmental externalities and thus should be required to make payments to devel-
oping countries to compensate them for the cost of maintaining the world's environment).
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those instances where preservation would not otherwise occur and
where the value of preservation to the global community is significant.
Dispersing appropriate levels of compensation to developing nations
will be difficult, as issues of compensation magnitude, timing and allo-
cation must be addressed. 47 However, a rigorous analysis of these
and other issues must be made if conservation efforts under the Bi-
odiversity Convention are to be more than just a "shot in the dark."14s
Several steps should be taken by the Clinton Administration to
enhance the efficacy and efficiency of compensation under the Con-
vention. First, multi-lateral funds should be allocated to developing
countries using biodiversity measures (such the amount and/or diver-
sity of species in a nation) rather than typical aid measures like popu-
lation or geographic size. Second, a list of conservation-related
technologies needs to be developed. In order to balance the efficient
preservation of biodiversity with the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights and in light of financial constraints, only conservation tech-
nologies which (i) face significant transaction costs in their
disbursement to developing country users and (ii) provide a net posi-
tive benefit for the preservation of biodiversity (after reimbursing the
owners of these technologies) should be transferred. Third, in order
to maintain incentives for the development of conservation-related
technologies, the multi-lateral fund should make payments to the
owners of those technologies which are transferred to the developing
world. Finally, Article 16, paragraph 3 should be stricken from the
Convention, as mandatory transfers of genetic-engineering technology
do not meaningfully foster the efficient conservation of biodiversity or
further U.S. interests. As well, genetic-engineering technology trans-
fers would siphon limited resources away from other important con-
servation initiatives and would be unfair to those corporations which
enjoy first mover advantages in the biotechnology industry.
In closing, many aspects of the Biodiversity Convention (and in
particular, the grant of a sovereign property right in unmodified ge-
netic material) further the goal of efficiently preserving biodiversity.
However, as this Comment has endeavored to show, absent (i) a
strong financial commitment by the developed world, (ii) certain clari-
fications related to the Convention's implementation and (iii) the es-
tablishment of an effective liability structure to properly balance the
147 See discussion infra part XI.
148 See Barton, supra note 13, at 775 (noting that the United Nations Economic Commission
for Latin America has already called for the pricing of biodiversity).
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costs of development against conservation, the Biodiversity Conven-
tion could easily founder.
